Essays

III. Applied Ethics: Hedonistic Utilitarianism in Practice

Having established the meta-ethical foundation of normative qualia and developed hedonistic utilitarianism as our normative framework, we now turn to concrete ethical issues. This essay demonstrates how hedonistic utilitarianism provides compelling, nuanced solutions to real-world moral problems while avoiding the pitfalls of both rigid deontology and unprincipled relativism.

Part I: Global Poverty and Effective Altruism

1.1 The Moral Imperative

From a hedonistic utilitarian perspective, global poverty represents one of the most significant sources of preventable negative normative qualia. Poverty correlates strongly with physical suffering, psychological distress, reduced life expectancy, and limited opportunities for positive experiences.

The numbers are staggering: hundreds of millions experience chronic hunger, preventable diseases, and extreme deprivation. Each instance represents real negative normative qualia—not abstract statistics but direct conscious suffering identical in nature to any suffering we might experience ourselves.

1.2 Effective Interventions

Hedonistic utilitarianism doesn't just demand action—it demands effective action. Research by organisations like GiveWell identifies interventions with the highest impact per dollar on normative qualia:

20, August 2025

II. Normative Ethics: Hedonistic Utilitarianism

Having established in the previous essay that positive and negative normative qualia are identical to intrinsic value and disvalue, we now turn to the normative question: what ought we to do? This essay argues that hedonistic utilitarianism follows naturally from our meta-ethical foundation—we ought to maximise positive normative qualia and minimise negative normative qualia across all conscious beings.

Part I: From Meta-Ethics to Normative Theory

1.1 The Transitional Logic

If we accept that:

Positive normative qualia are the only intrinsic goods
Negative normative qualia are the only intrinsic bads
We ought to promote what is intrinsically good and prevent what is intrinsically bad

Then it follows that we ought to maximise positive normative qualia and minimise negative normative qualia. This is the core of hedonistic utilitarianism.

1.2 Why Maximisation?

One might ask: why maximise rather than simply promote? The answer lies in the nature of normative qualia themselves. If positive normative qualia are intrinsically valuable, then more positive normative qualia is more valuable. There's no coherent point at which we should say "that's enough value; additional value would not be good." Value is inherently something to be maximised, not merely satisfied.

8, August 2025

I. Meta Ethics: Analytic Hedonism

This essay draws heavily on the work of Sharon Hewitt Rawlette, specifically her book ‘The Feeling of Value’.

In this essay I will argue that pleasure is identical to intrinsic value and pain is identical to intrinsic disvalue (analytic hedonism), and that this provides a foundation for objective ethics (moral realism).

Key Terminology:

Throughout I will be using value/good and disvalue/bad interchangeably.

Intrinsic vs instrumental: Intrinsic things are ends within themselves, rather than a means to an end. For example, money is instrumentally valuable because it is a mean to the end that is (in the case of a hedonist) pleasure. Pleasure is of intrinsic value because it is the end goal (however, pleasure can also be instrumentally valuable, but it is always intrinsically valuable).

Part I: Core Definitions

1.1 Analytic Statements:

In philosophy, ‘analytic’ statements are true by definition, because they reveal necessary conceptual truths, and not just arbitrary linguistic conventions. For example, ‘triangles have three sides’ captures something essential about what triangles must be, not just how we happen to use the words.